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Preface 
 
 This thesis was written for the final stage of my master in Political Science on Leiden 
University. I started this master in September 2012 after having completed a bachelor degree in 
Public Management and Organisational science at the VU University in Amsterdam, with a minor 
at Oxford-Brookes University in Great-Britain.  
 I chose to write this over Kenya’s ethnic conflict of 2007-08 because I always had an 
interest in African affairs. During my bachelor I attended some courses where conflict as well as 
post-war reconstruction were discussed, and found these topics interesting as well. The choice for 
Kenya was initially almost coincidental: initially I had wanted to do a quantitative research 
project, which was later changed to a case study of a few African states. After a while, I decided 
to focus on two cases alone: Kenya and Nigeria. During the writing process I decided to drop the 
Nigeria case and focus exclusively at Kenya, since I had found that case had enough material to 
write multiple theses about. The affairs of Kenya have grabbed my attention while writing this 
thesis, and I will continue to follow that country’s developments with great interest.  
 
 A number of people have helped me during the writing of this thesis, and I would like to 
make use of this preface to thank them. First, my thesis supervisor and first reader Dr. Jan Erk for 
his support, feedback, as well as the discussions and the books and magazines I was able to 
borrow. I would also like to thank my second reader Dr. Lee Seymour because – even though we 
have not had any personal contact – through Dr. Erk he did provide feedback on the research 
proposal. Some of this thesis was based on an earlier paper I wrote, on which Dr. Frank de Zwart 
gave extensive feedback as well as some hints on where to look for relevant literature. Then I 
would like to thank the people who read my thesis in its last phases and provided feedback from 
their various points of view: Corné Nijburg, Nicole van Diest, Bryan Rijnders and Frances van de 
Vel.  
 
 Finally and perhaps most importantly, I would like to thank you, the reader, for taking the 
time to read this thesis.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 Africa, for the first time since decolonisation, is booming. The African economies are 
growing, conflict seems to be down in some areas, and even the rampant corruption is being 
addressed. A recent report by The Economist confirmed these positive trends, claiming Africa is 
“the world’s fastest growing economy just now” (2013: p. 3). However, despite the optimism 
there are still plenty of problems for Africa to address. African countries are still addicted to aid 
according to Dambisa Moyo’s influential book Dead Aid (2009). Though the economy is 
developing, still 47,5% of the population lives of less than 1,25 dollar per day, the highest 
percentage in the world (World Development Indicators, 2008). Furthermore, conflict may be 
down from its peak in the early 90’s, but there is still a lot of conflict: in 2012, the Heidelberg 
Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) listed 90 conflicts in in Sub-Saharan Africa 
with 18 of those classified as ‘highly violent’, the largest number since it began measuring this in 
1945 (2013: p. 29). This indicator suggests conflict has even increased in recent years, despite the 
economic growth. Africa may thus be making progress, but there is still a long way to go.  
 Conflict is seen by many scholars as the main cause of Africa’s problems: the continent is 
the most conflict-ridden one in the world (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002a: p. 13). As in the rest of the 
world, during the last few decades African states have seen relatively little inter-state conflict. 
Instead, intra-state conflict seems to be most prevalent: violence within rather than between states. 
In particular, ethnic civil wars are very common amongst African states (HIIK, 2013: p. 30). That 
these conflicts affect economic development seems a given; most scholars agree that political 
instability and conflict negatively affect economic growth (e.g. Alesina, Özler, Roubini & Swagel, 
1996). But if economic growth is up in African countries, why is conflict not down? One might 
expect economic development to appease ethnic divides in a country, since every group can profit 
from this progress. Yet the data from the HIIK seem to indicate an opposite pattern: has the 
economic boom increased rather than decreased ethnic conflict in Africa? Even a relatively stable 
country such as Kenya, which had for years known peace and growth, relapsed into ethnic conflict 
after the 2008 elections. How is this possible?  
 
 In order to answer questions like this, researchers need to look at the relation between 
ethnic diversity, economic development and violent conflict. Unfortunately, no definitive proof on 
the questions has been found in scientific literature. There has been a lot of research on how 
economic variables and ethnic conflict are interrelated. However, the explanations found have 
often been inconsistent with one another. Since 2000 though, there has been a promising 
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theoretical approach that garnered much attention: Paul Collier’s greed hypothesis (2000). This 
theory attempts to use economic variables to explain and even predict civil conflicts. It focuses on 
the economic aspects of a civil war: how elites instigate and use conflicts to further their own 
interests. Often, these conflicts are about a centralised rebellion fighting against the state over 
control of some important resources. The theory has been tested through quantitative means 
numerous times, yet rarely in a qualitative analysis. This thesis will provide a qualitative analysis 
using the greed hypothesis to attempt to explain ethnic conflict in a case study: the 2007-08 post-
election violence in Kenya. In this way the thesis will provide explanations and insights into the 
Kenya conflict, particularly by focusing on the relevant economic variables and motives. At the 
same time, this will be a reflection upon the greed hypothesis to see if it is suited for explaining 
civil conflicts such as the one in Kenya. For this project, the following research question and sub-
questions have been established: 
 
How can the greed hypothesis be used to explain the explosion of violence in Kenya after the 2007 
general elections? 
 
 What does the existing scientific literature say about the relation between economic 
variables and ethnic conflict? 
 Is it possible to establish some conditions, based on the literature, that need to be met for a 
civil conflict to arise? 
 Can the violence during the Kenya crisis be explained by using the greed hypothesis and 
these conditions that arose from it? 
 How does the analysis of Kenya’s crisis reflect on the greed hypothesis literature? 
 
 The first two of these sub-questions will be answered on the basis of a theoretical study. 
Here, a theoretical framework will be established by first looking at the literature on the relation 
between the variables of economic development, ethnic fragmentation and civil conflict. For this, 
relevant articles by various scholars will be discussed. The greed hypothesis will be discussed at 
some length, and four conditions for civil conflict to occur will be set based on this literature.  
 The final two sub-questions will be answered using a case-study of Kenya. Using 
information from academic articles on Kenya’s 2007-08 crisis as well as reports by the Kenyan 
government as well as neutral NGO’s, first an overview of Kenya’s crisis will be given. The 
information from this overview will then be analysed and compared to the information from the 
greed hypothesis. The four conditions that have been established in the previous sections will be 
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tested in practice. Finally, the greed literature will be reflected upon in the light of the new 
insights coming from the case study.  
 
 In this way, this thesis will show that the greed hypothesis provides an effective 
explanation for some conflicts. However, there are numerous pitfalls in its logic and it is not as 
effective in explaining the more local and diffuse kind of violence as can be seen in the Kenya 
case. The greed hypothesis provides interesting insights into what motivates elites to start and 
continue conflicts, but this is a short-term logic. The more structural causes of conflict may not lie 
in the greed of elites, but in the ethnic grievances and institutional problems that are used to 
mobilise the masses.  
 This thesis will consist of six chapters. After this introduction, a theoretical framework 
will be provided to answer the first two sub-questions in chapter 2. Then follows a background 
and description of the Kenya crisis in chapter 3. Chapters 4 and 5 will attempt to answer the third 
and fourth sub-question respectively, focusing upon the analysis of the Kenya case and reflection 
on the literature. Finally, a conclusion will be given in which the findings of the earlier chapters 
will be summarised.  
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2 Theoretical framework 
 
 In conflicts like Kenya’s 2007-08 post-election violence, there are many different factors 
playing a role. Ethnicity is an important factor, but can ethnic diversity within states cause a 
conflict by itself? Besides ethnicity, there are a number of economic variables that could be 
important. What does the literature say about the definitions and effects of these variables? In this 
section, the existing academic literature will be studied to find the answers to two of the questions 
asked in the introduction. First, what does the existing scientific literature say about the relation 
between economic variables and ethnic conflict? And second, is it possible to establish some 
conditions, based on the literature, that need to be met for a civil conflict to arise? To answer these 
questions, this literature review part of the thesis will look at a number of both theoretical and 
empirical books and articles in order to establish a theoretical framework to build the rest of this 
thesis on.  
 
2.1 Ethnic fragmentation and conflict 
 Before anything can be said about the relation between economic variables and ethnic 
conflict, this thesis first needs to establish whether ethnic conflicts are actually different from 
other conflicts. Does ethnic diversity cause conflicts? In this case, ethnic diversity refers to the 
chance that two randomly selected people from the same country are from different ethnic groups. 
Ethnic groups are, of course, hard to define. Fredrik Barth names four aspects of an ethnic group: 
it is biologically self-perpetuating, shares fundamental cultural values, members communicate and 
interact, and the members identify themselves as members and are identified by others as 
members of the group (Barth, 1969: p. 10-11). Barth stresses boundaries in his definition of 
ethnicity: according to him, groups are defined by what they are not (1969). However, all this is 
hard to quantify. Thus, most quantitative studies use Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation or ELF to 
measure ethnic diversity (Posner, 2004: p. 489). This measure focuses on one aspect of ethnic 
fragmentation: differences in language. Although questions on the relation between ethnic 
diversity and conflict may lead to philosophical debates about the nature of ethnicity, for reasons 
of brevity and conciseness this literature review will mainly limit itself to existing empirical 
research on the topic. Still, it is important to have some insight into the main theories on ethnicity 
before focusing on its empirical effects. 
 In the social sciences, there are two main streams of thought on the effects of ethnicity: 
primordialist and instrumentalist (Matuszeski & Schneider, 2006; p. 17-19). The former claims 
that a person’s ethnicity is an inherent part of their utility function, thus influencing their 
Master thesis – Mobilising Grievances 
Diallo Nijburg, s1309749 
7 
 
preferences and choices directly. Instrumentalist – or circumstantialist – theories, on the other 
hand, claim that people are not concerned with ethnicity itself but use it as a strategic means to 
achieve other goals. These two lines of thinking can clearly be seen in the literature on the relation 
between ethnicity and conflict. Amongst the instrumentalists in this debate are authors such as 
Caselli and Colemann (2006), whose research article claims that ethnicity is a tool used by groups 
to enforce group membership. Similarly, Glaeser (2002) describes how politicians can mobilise 
groups on an ethnic basis using (supposed) crimes by the other ethnic group to incite hatred. 
However, the primordialists claim that instead of just being a mobilising mechanism, ethnicity has 
an inherent value. The article ‘The Integrative Revolution’ by Clifford Geertz (1963) claims that 
“congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times 
overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves” (Geertz, 1963: p. 109). Geertz is not a classic 
primordialist, he does not believe that ethnicity is defined by biological values. He argues that it is 
constructed, but ascribes an inherent value to this construct that instrumentalists to not believe to 
be real. More recent authors such as Gil-White (1999) also follow this approach. Although they 
do not themselves support it, authors Fearon and Laitin describe the most extreme form of the 
primordialist argument: in some cases conflict between two ethnic groups is inevitable because of 
inherent cultural and ethnic characteristics (Fearon & Laitin, 2000: p. 849). In recent years the 
debate between the two sides has settled down a bit, with many scholars claiming the two streams 
of thought are not as different as they were made out to be. Matuszeski and Schneider for 
instance, although mostly instrumentalist in their reasoning, argue that “[i]n many cases, 
primordialist arguments can serve to strengthen the theories we describe” (2006: p. 17). What 
authors from both sides certainly agree on, is that ethnicity does influence civil conflict, even if 
there is controversy on how exactly this works. 
 
 Besides the more philosophical debates, many researchers have done empirical research 
on the effects of ethnicity on conflict. Authors Janina Matuszeski and Frank Schneider (2006) did 
research on the relation between ethnic fractionalisation and civil conflict. They claim the existing 
literature on this topic lacks “conclusive evidence concerning the effect of fractionalisation on 
civil conflict” (Matuszeski & Schneider, 2006; p. 3). Theoretically, they use existing arguments to 
show how ethnic diversity does increase the risk of civil conflict (Matuszeski & Schneider, 2006; 
p. 18). For instance, they quote authors such as Caselli and Coleman (2006), who claim that 
ethnicity plays a large role in creating coalitions during civil conflict. Another risk factor that 
Matuszeski and Schneider name is ethnic clustering: when ethnic groups are located in 
geographically distinct areas, public goods will only benefit one of these groups if located in one 
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area (2006: p. 19-20). This may cause feelings of preferential treatment towards one group, which 
can increase the risk of civil conflict.  
 Using a new index of measuring ethnic diversity called the Ethnic Diversity and 
Clustering (EDC) index as well as the well-known ELF index, Matuszeski and Schneider 
correlated ethnic fragmentation with indicators of civil wars such as the number of conflicts, their 
duration and the number of casualties. The authors conclude that both ethnic diversity and 
clustering are “significantly correlated with the incidence and overall impact of conflict on a 
country” (2006: p. 28-29). Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2010) underline these conclusions in 
their research, showing that civil wars tend to last significantly longer in ethnically polarised 
countries.  
 Although the assumption that more ethnic fractionalisation leads to more ethnic conflicts 
seems intuitive from the above theoretical arguments and empirical correlations, it is far from a 
proven fact. Unlike the authors cited above, some others have found wildly differing results. For 
instance, Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue academics should not “infer that ethnic diversity is the 
root cause of civil conflict” (2003: p. 88). In a later research by the same two authors with Kimuli 
Kasara (2007), they confirmed the earlier idea that ethnic diversity does not cause civil war, and 
neither does rule by an ethnic minority work as a potent predictor (2007: p. 193). Elbadawi and 
Sambanis (2000) even claim that ethnic diversity can have a preventive effect on civil war as it 
“necessitates inter-group bargaining processes” (2000: p. 244). In other words, because in a 
greatly ethnically fragmented society none of the groups have the power to impose their will onto 
others negotiation is necessary between groups. This may lead to a more peaceful rather than a 
more violent society. For these reasons, Caselli and Coleman (2006) propose an inverted U-
shaped relationship between ethnic diversity and conflict: a very low or a very high ethnic 
diversity reduces the chance of conflict, while having a small number of large ethnic groups 
increases the risk.  
 
 Collier and Hoeffler (2002a) also questioned the use of ethnicity alone as an explanatory 
variable: according to them, Africa’s bad economic performance rather than problems in its social 
structure were the main causes of conflict. In a follow-up on their article mentioned above, 
Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) confirmed the importance of economic performance in predicting 
civil conflict, as well as emphasising the role of certain political variables. However, they saw 
ethnic fragmentation as measured by the ELF index as an important moderating variable 
(Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2002: p. 329). Kanbur, Rajaram and Varshney (2011) also warn not to 
overestimate the role of ethnicity by itself. They claim there are important feedback effects from 
violence to ethnicity that enlarge ethnic differences, and that ethnicity and violence can both be 
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caused by the same explanatory variables, such as colonial heritage and social mobilisation by 
politicians (Kanbur e.a., 2011: p. 150). Like the previously mentioned authors, they point towards 
the economic performance of the country as an important explanatory variable.  
 The link between ethnic fragmentation and civil conflict is thus unclear. There does 
appear to be a correlation between ethnic diversity and civil conflict, but as all social scientists 
know correlation does not imply causation. Variables other than ethnic fragmentation must be 
taken into account when measuring the risk of civil war in a state. Since it has already been 
mentioned by a few of the authors quoted in this section, perhaps the most promising of these 
alternate explanatory variables is the economic performance of a country.  
 
2.2 Ethnic diversity and economy 
 As the above quoted literature shows, ethnic diversity does in many cases correlate with 
civil conflict. On the other hand, this does not mean that ethnic diversity actually causes the 
conflicts. As authors such as Collier and Hoeffler (2002a) argue, other factors are also important 
in this relationship, economic variables first of all. So is it perhaps possible that ethnic diversity 
increases the risk of conflict through the mediating effect of economic performance. In order to 
find out if there is any truth in this idea, this section will establish whether the presence of 
different ethnic groups in a country affects that country’s economic performance. Economic 
performance, in this case, is most often seen in the simple form of economic (GDP) growth. Of 
course there are other variables that are important: whether this growth is based on primary 
commodity exports or manufacturing, whether the wealth is shared evenly between groups or 
hoarded by a small group, and what the political situation in the country is. Other sections of this 
literature overview will discuss these variables, but most of the literature in this part 
conceptualises economic performance simply as economic growth. 
 In 1997, William Easterly and Ross Levine released their influential article ‘Africa’s 
growth tragedy: Policies and ethnic divisions’. In this article, they hypothesised that differences in 
ethnic diversity between countries account for much of the differences in economic performance 
between the countries (Easterly & Levine, 1997: p. 1205). They claimed ethnic diversity 
influences economic performance through affecting the government’s policy decisions: societies 
that are ethnically diverse may have trouble reaching consensus on government policies, which 
could harm economic performance by resulting in bad policies or even a lack of governance 
(Easterly & Levine, 1997: p. 1230). The two authors tested this hypothesis by using the ELF 
index to link ethnic diversity to a number of indicators of economic performance. The article 
concludes that “[h]igh ethnic diversity is closely associated with low schooling, underdeveloped 
financial systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, and insufficient infrastructure” (Easterly & 
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Levine, 1997: p. 1241), all of which are predictors of low economic growth. Ethnic diversity both 
directly and indirectly influences economic growth, but according to Easterly and Levine is also 
associated with lower worker productivity (1997: p. 1240-1241). The results of this study were 
often re-tested by other authors. Alesina and his colleagues confirmed most of the results, 
although the link they found was not as strong as indicated by Easterly and Levine (Alesina e.a., 
2002: p. 17). Campos, Saleh and Kuzeyev (2009) tested the model with different measures for 
ethnic diversity and found a strong negative link between ethnic diversity and economic 
performance.  
 
 Despite the praise Easterly and Levine got from some academics, others were more 
critical. Arcand, Guillaumont and Jeanneney (2000) questioned the results on both theoretical and 
empirical grounds. According to the authors, the results of the Easterly and Levine study “are both 
debatable and weak from an econometric point of view” (Arcand e.a., 2000: p. 937). The evidence 
is inconclusive, although Arcand e.a. do not deny the importance of ethnic fragmentation for 
economic performance (2000: p. 936). In a more recent article, Birnir and Waguespack (2011) 
found that ethnic diversity per se is not the relevant variable for predicting economic growth. 
Instead they hypothesised that if multiple groups are present and represented in a country, that 
country’s economic performance will only improve. This hypothesis was only partly confirmed in 
their research though: ethnic diversity still had a negative impact on economic performance, but 
an ethnically diverse government could prevent some of this (Birnir & Waguespack, 2011). Other 
authors, such as Fosu (1992) and Alesina e.a. (1996) found that instead of ethnic diversity, 
political instability – which, according to the previous paragraphs, may or may not be influenced 
by ethnic diversity – influences economic performance.  
 One thing to keep in mind during all this is that most of the articles quoted above were 
written before the Africa economies started to boom in the first decade of the 21st century. Even 
some highly ethnically diverse countries grew fast, such as Ethiopia, Angola and Namibia (WDI, 
2013). At the same time, a country like Eritrea is ethnically homogeneous yet shows very little 
economic growth. This does not mean that the results from the studies quoted above are not valid, 
just that they need to be seen in perspective. Ethnic diversity is but one of many factors that affect 
economic growth, and the relation to the variables is not a linear causation.  
 
2.3 The free market economy 
 There is a lot of research on the links between ethnicity and civil conflict and between 
ethnicity and economy, but the results are often inconclusive or even contradictory. However, 
there does seem to be a correlation between a high ethnic diversity in a country, lack of economic 
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development and high risk of civil conflict – even if, again, this does not mean there is definite 
proof of causation. Either way, this is bad news for Africa, which is a highly ethnically diverse 
continent. But what does the economic performance then mean for the risk of civil wars in Africa? 
Does economic development encourage civil war or does it stabilise old ethnic conflicts? And 
which aspects of economic development matter most in this? 
 The place to start looking for an answer to the above question might be on the basis of our 
current economic system. That basis is formed by the ideology of the open capitalist market. Most 
African countries also apply this free market in their economy, although some embrace it more 
fully than others. But does having a free market stabilise a country? The western liberal ideology 
claims that a democratic government and an open market economy are likely to ensure a country 
becomes prosperous and stable. This hypothesis is called the liberal peace, a theory that claims 
that it is unlikely for two countries with democratic political institutions to go to war with one 
another (Doyle, 2005: p. 463). Although this theory is normally about democracy as the crucial 
variable, many have expanded it to include institutions of the free market economy. This theory is 
most often applied to inter-state conflict: it claims that states that depend on each other in trade 
will cooperate rather than seek conflict. Interdependence and trade thus lead to peace. According 
to the academics Roger Mac Ginty and Andrew Williams, this theory “has an impeccable 
intellectual pedigree” (2009: p. 24) thanks to the writings of established social scientists such as 
Rawls (1999) and Fukuyama (1989). The author Jack Levy even goes as far as to claim it “comes 
as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations” (1988: p. 662). There 
is also some empirical evidence to support the liberal peace argument: an article by Oneal, Oneal, 
Maoz and Russett showed that trade and economic interdependence between countries indeed 
reduces the risk of a conflict occurring (1996). A follow-up by Oneal and Russett confirmed these 
findings (1996).  
 While there is a lot of support for the liberal peace hypothesis on both theoretical and 
empirical grounds, there is also a lot of criticism (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009: p. 25). David 
Spiro is an important critic of the liberal peace, arguing that the theory only applies under very 
specific conditions (1994). He claims the scholars who found empirical evidence in support of the 
liberal peace manipulated important variables such as what constitutes as a liberal state in order to 
make sure “data analysis yields the results they seek” (Spiro, 1994: p. 55). Spiro’s statements 
were supported by John Mearsheimer, who claims that there have not been enough situations 
where two liberal countries could go to war with each other to constitute as evidence in support of 
the thesis (1990: p. 50). However, despite the criticism the liberal peace is one of the most 
influential theories in the social sciences and has a good empirical and intellectual foundation 
(Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009: p. 24).  
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 So if the liberal peace theory is correct, there is a great opportunity for developing 
countries. If these countries become democratic and adopt a free market economy, they will avoid 
conflict with other states. But does the liberal peace also apply in the case of intra-state conflict? 
The original theory was concerned with inter-state warfare, not with conflict within a state. Yet 
civil conflicts, particularly on an ethnic basis, are far more common now than wars between states 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2002b: p. 3). There is some potential for the theory to apply to intra-state 
conflict as well. An open economy may not only make states dependent on each other, it could 
also make individuals in the society depend on others, even from different ethnic groups. 
Furthermore, the meritocracy that should be present in a competitive market-based economy 
ignores ethnicity, valuing work-rate and intelligence above which ethnic group a person is from. 
However, ethnic groups within a country are not unitary actors that states in the liberal peace 
model are assumed to be. This makes appliance of the liberal peace to intra-state relations 
difficult. Is there any empirical support for a positive relation between an open market and peace? 
Academics Gissinger and Gleditsch have done research on the effect of trade openness – the 
percentage of a country’s GDP that is formed by trade – on the risk of civil conflict (1999). They 
showed that more openness in trade leads to a reduced risk of civil conflict. This seems to imply 
that in the relations between ethnic groups there is a similar effect to the liberal peace effect 
between democratic states, although it will obviously take a completely different form. De Soysa 
confirmed these findings in a study of what predicts a civil war (2002). Krause and Suzuki also 
confirmed the hypothesis, showing that even when a country is ethnically fragmented trade 
openness reduces the risk of a civil conflict starting (2005: p. 38).  
 Yet not all academics agree with the appliance of the liberal peace in civil conflicts. Many, 
in fact, claim a market economy increases rather than decreases the risk of instability and violence 
within a state (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009: p. 25). A free market economy may benefit some 
groups over others, leading to increased inequality. Dependency theorists are especially critical of 
the effects of the open market on developing countries. Gissinger and Gleditsch are no 
dependency theorists themselves, but do summarise its main argument in one of their articles: “a 
high degree of openness in the economy leads to a high degree of income inequality, which in turn 
increases the likelihood of armed conflict” (1999: p. 338). Should this inequality occur along 
ethnic lines, the risk of a civil conflict may increase further. The scholars Boswell and Dixon also 
conclude that the risk of civil conflict is only increased by economic dependency: they argue 
market capitalism causes greater income inequality and have negative effects on class structures 
as well as state institutions, all of which can cause a rebellion (1990: p. 540). Not only 
dependency theorists, but also critical theorists such as Michael Pugh are sceptical of the effects a 
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free market has on developing states. Pugh claims an open economy increases the risk of violence 
breaking out by making the population more vulnerable to poverty and extortion in black markets 
(2005: p. 23). In between the extremes that are found in the proponents of the liberal peace on one 
hand and the dependency- and critical theorists on the other are authors such as Gissinger and 
Gleditsch. They argue trade openness may have a beneficial effect by reducing the risk of civil 
conflict, but only under specific circumstances (1999: p. 327). Important factors in this are 
whether the country relies on the export of agricultural or manufactured goods: exporters of 
agricultural products will be more likely to see violent conflict than those of manufactured goods 
(Gissinger & Gletitsch, 1999). This is because exporters of manufactured goods gain more from 
trade, since exporting agricultural products does not provide the country with a high income. 
However, Gissinger and Gleditsch do agree with critical theory in that free markets can increase 
inequality and poverty, again depending on the circumstances (1999). But if a free market leads to 
increased poverty and inequality, what kind of effect does that have on the risk of civil conflict? 
And what is the role of the kind of products a country exports plays in this? 
 
2.4 Inequality, poverty and natural resources 
 The literature thus does not provide a clear answer to whether having a capitalist open 
market will decrease the risk of civil conflict occurring. But that open market might not be the 
most important economic variable in this regard. The fact that a country has an open market does 
not necessarily mean the country’s economy will grow, or even that poverty will be reduced. Yet 
some research seems to indicate that economic growth is important in preventing a violent civil 
conflict. Bohlken and Sergenti (2010) did research into the effect of economic growth on the 
occurrence of riots between Hindu’s and Muslims in India. They found that economic growth 
significantly reduced the risk of riots: a 1% increase in growth rate reduced the expected number 
of conflicts by as much as 5% (Bohlken & Sergenti, 2010: p. 589). In the African context, Collier 
and Hoeffler ascribed the high level of conflict in the continent to economic factors: “Africa has 
experienced a rising trend of conflict because its economies have performed so poorly both 
absolutely and relative to other regions” (2002a: p. 14). They found that a higher average GDP per 
person in a country and the growth of GDP reduce the risk of a civil conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2002a: p. 22). Londregan and Poole furthermore confirmed that poverty, another important 
economic variable, is closely related to the number of coups in a country (1990). In fact, 
according to them poverty is even “close to being a necessary condition” for a country to 
experience military coups (Londregan & Poole, 1990: p. 151). But how do economic conditions 
such as poverty and lack of economic growth increase the risk of violence in the form of civil 
wars of coups? Bohlken and Sergenti (2010) claim this works through the mechanism of ethnic 
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competition: ethnic groups will compete with one another for the available resources. When there 
are fewer resources available due to bad economic conditions, the struggle for those that are 
available will increase (Bohlken & Sergenti, 2010: p. 592). Thus, both in free markets and in other 
types of economies, a lack of economic development can increase the risk of violent conflict. And 
yet, this is not the only factor that is relevant in this regard. 
 Even when there is economic development, there can still be a risk of conflict if this 
development is shared unevenly between different ethnic groups. If one group is perceived to be 
profiting more from development than others, this may cause jealousy and even violent reactions. 
Inequality has long been a common topic in research in the area (Gissinger & Gleditsch, 1999: p. 
337-338). Authors such as Boswell and Dixon claim that inequality can significantly increase the 
risk of violent civil conflict in a state (1990). But empirical studies have shown that perhaps even 
more than inequality, the content of a country’s export products predicts the risk of civil conflict. 
As was mentioned above, Gissinger and Gleditsch argued that a dependence on the export of 
agricultural products may have a negative effect on the economic performance of the country, as 
well as increasing inequality and unrest (1999: p. 353-354). Similarly, Bannon and Collier found a 
high correlation between the percentage of commodity exports such as oil, minerals, and 
agricultural products and the risk of civil conflict (2003). But how does having natural resources 
and exporting them lead to more conflict?  
 
2.5 Greed or grievance? 
 As can be seen from the above literature, there is still a lot of controversy on what kind of 
effects economic development has on civil conflict. But there is a growing consensus in the 
spheres of both policy makers and academics that development and conflict are closely linked 
(Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009: p. 42). But how does this link work? Paul Collier (2000) and his 
colleagues provided one answer to that question: the ‘greed hypothesis’, which has since then 
become one of the most important theories on the link between economic factors and civil 
conflict. The greed hypothesis is based on the rational choice approach to social science, which 
claims that people are in the end self-interested and motivated by economic gain (Hindmoor, 
2010: p. 42-43). Applied in the greed hypothesis, this theory claims it can use economic variables 
to successfully predict countries that are at a high risk of going to civil war (Mac Ginty & 
Williams, 2009: p. 30). But what is perhaps more important is that it also provides a theoretical 
explanation for how economic factors can make countries more or less war-prone: it assumes that 
economic factors are the motives for combatants to enter, continue or leave a conflict (Mac Ginty 
& Williams, 2009: p. 30). Collier contrasts two kinds of theories on what motivates people to 
enter a conflict: greed and grievance theories (2006). The latter claim that people enter a conflict 
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because they experience grievances that they feel need to be rectified. These grievances could 
include social injustice, inequality, and ethnic discrimination. According to Collier, these only 
correlate with conflict because they act as an official rationale for the conflict, something political 
elites use to mobilise ethnic groups while using the conflict to chase personal economic gain 
(Collier, 2006: p. 1). Economic aspects such as income inequality, lack of economic growth, low 
GDP, and a high percentage of commodity exports then predict civil wars because “they enable 
rebel leaders to buy the guns and feed the soldiers, and furthermore to perpetrate large scale 
killing without themselves being killed in the process” (Collier, 2006: p. 22). In other words, 
grievances alone are not enough to cause a conflict. There has to be some form of economic gain 
for a group that has the power to mobilise certain ethnic groups for economic gain. According to 
the greed hypothesis then, only where grievances go combined with economic opportunities there 
is a high risk of civil war. 
 The economic gain that motivates political elites to start or continue a civil conflict can 
take different forms. Grossman focuses on the exploitation of the economic resources of the state 
and claims that a rebel leader will try to gain control over the state in order to control these 
resources (1999). Potential rebels will thus see whether the possible gains from taking over the 
state’s resources outweighs the costs and risks of entering a conflict before making a decision on 
whether or not rebel (Grossman, 1999). These resources that the state and rebel groups fight over 
often take the form of natural resources. This may explain why academics such as Caselli and 
Coleman (2006) and Bannon and Collier (2003) find a correlation between commodity exports 
and risk of civil conflict. Commodities such as oil or mineral wealth can easily be captured by 
certain groups and have a high enough value to finance a conflict. Thus, where there is an 
abundance of natural resources there is both motive and opportunity for political elites to try to 
capture those through a rebel movement. However, not all agree to this view. Fearon and Laitin 
argue that instead of all natural resources, only certain minerals and some forms of contraband –
such as narcotics – have a high enough inherent value to be used to finance a civil conflict (2003: 
p. 87). Krause and Suzuki reach a different conclusion: they find that rather than minerals such as 
gold or diamonds, only oil exports are important in predicting civil conflict (2005: p. 32-33). 
Fearon and Laitin argue that this relation between oil export and conflict is a spurious one: 
according to them, oil exporting countries generally have a weaker government, and are more 
likely to enter civil conflict because of this weakness in the government rather than directly 
because of the oil (Fearon & Laitin, 2003: p. 87). But in the words of De Soysa, natural resources 
are “a potent predictor of conflict” (2002: p. 413) since the presence of natural resources is 
significantly correlated with conflict in her quantitative study. From a theoretical perspective this 
also makes sense, since commodity exports and natural resources offer opportunities for extortion 
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that are not present in countries without any natural resources, which should thus have a lower 
risk of civil conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002b: p. 7).Yet a simple look at recent African history 
shows that conflict is not exclusive to states that are rich in natural resources: Rwanda, for 
instance, does not have many resources yet has known a lot of ethnic conflict. How can this be 
explained? Collier and Hoeffler name two other sources of income that can be used by rebels to 
finance their conflict: donations from diasporas of the ethnic groups, and financial support from 
governments or other organisations that are hostile to the country the group aims to rebel against 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2002b). Using sources of income such as these, rebellion and conflict can be 
profitable according to the greed hypothesis, even in states that lack natural resources.  
 
 One thing from the correlations mentioned in earlier sections does not seem to work with 
the greed hypothesis: how does poverty and a low GDP lead to an increased risk of conflict? 
Should the potential spoils of a rebellion not be lower in a poorer country, thus dissuading 
political elites from taking the risks of entering a civil war? According to Bohlken and Sergenti, 
this can at least partly be explained by a lower opportunity cost of riots during difficult economic 
times: the cost of foregone wages and other lost revenue through rioting drops relative to the 
possible gains from plundering (2010: p. 952), making recruitment of potential fighters easier. 
Furthermore, according to Fearon and Laitin such measures as GDP are instead a “proxy” for 
government capacity (2003: p. 76). In other words, poorer states have a weaker government. This 
fits into a greed hypothesis of conflict: a state with lower government capacity means it is easier 
to subvert, thus decreasing the costs of rebellion.  
 At first sight, the greed hypothesis seems to imply that grievances are unimportant in 
conflict. Wars are not decided by who is right or wrong, but by who has the economic means to 
see the conflict through (Collier, 2006 p. 3). Yet still, the ethnic grievances may matter after all. 
As Caselli and Coleman show, ethnicity is still important as a mobilising mechanism (2006). They 
do agree that greed is an important cause for conflict, but claim that grievances along ethnic lines 
are vital as ethnicity “provides a technology for group membership and exclusion which is used to 
avoid indiscriminate access to the spoils of conflict” (Caselli & Coleman, 2006: p. 30). 
Additionally, if economic growth is low, politicians can use this in electoral campaigning by 
blaming other ethnicities for the lack of growth and thereby instigate ethnic conflict (Bohlken & 
Sergenti, 2010: p. 592). If the growth is higher, the elite will instead be content with the status quo 
and refrain from using ethnic arguments. This is perhaps not exactly what the original greed thesis 
was concerned with, but certainly fits in. However, this is also a weakness of the greed 
hypothesis: it ignores ethnicity as a motivator for conflict. Primordialists will disagree with the 
greed hypothesis’ idea that economic gain is the only thing that motivates people since according 
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to them there is an inherent value in ethnicity. This remains one of the big questions of ethnic 
conflicts: is ethnicity really just a mobilising mechanism, or is it more than that?  
 A further weakness of the greed hypothesis is that it may look at the short term rather than 
structural causes of conflict. Perhaps the grievances that are present in societies would be 
activated into conflict eventually, no matter the economic circumstances? The short-term logic of 
greed may explain why a conflict occurs at a specific point in time, but there is much to be said in 
favour of looking at more structural causes of conflict. Perhaps ethnicity is one of those, as argued 
by primordialists. 
 
2.6 Conditions for civil conflict 
 The overarching message of the greed hypothesis is that grievances alone are not enough 
to instigate a civil war, but elites with a personal economic interest in creating a conflict are 
needed to turn grievances into conflict. Besides this, economic resources for financing any 
organised force are also necessary for a conflict to arise. However, this does not mean the 
grievances themselves are not at all important: there needs to be some form of inequality, 
discrimination, or injustice to be exploited by the political elite for them to be able to mobilise 
their groups. Furthermore, the government needs to be vulnerable – for instance through a low 
GDP or through ethnic fragmentation – or else a rebellion will not have much chance of 
succeeding. Based on the greed literature as well as on some of the major critiques on it, this 
suggests there is a total of four requirements for civil conflict: (1) the presence of perceived 
grievances on the basis of which ethnic groups can be mobilised; (2) a political elite with the 
capability of mobilising the ethnic group(s) that has an economic interest in promoting the 
conflict; (3) economic resources that can be captured for use by the rebel groups to finance their 
struggle; and (4) a government that is weak enough for the rebellion to be potentially successful. 
In this, the third and fourth condition seem to be similar. In some cases, the elite’s economic 
interest in the conflict and the economic resources that can be used to finance the rebellion may 
indeed be the same. An example could be a diamond mine: the desire to control this mine would 
motivate the elite group to start the conflict, while the revenue for this mine would provide means 
to continue it and defend the new possessions against the state. Yet in other cases, the economic 
motivation and the means for financing the conflict are different. If the economic goal is to gain 
control over the state, as in the conflicts Grossman (1999) focuses on, then that economic resource 
cannot be used to finance the struggle until the conflict is won. In such a case funding from 
sources such as a captured diamond mine, but also from gifts by diaspora groups, are not the 
economic motivator for the conflict but do serve as the means to continue it. For this reason, the 
third and fourth variables are separated.  
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 These conditions are not uncontroversial though: there may be some further weaknesses in 
the greed hypothesis. The theory originates from before Africa started to experience an economic 
boom in the first decade of the 21st century. During this economic boom, many countries saw 
growth rates rise to as much as 5 to 15%. What does this mean for the effect of the greed 
hypothesis? Liberals would expect that when there is potential for economic growth, ethnic 
groups will cooperate rather than compete against each other: the economy is not a zero-sum 
game, and by cooperation everyone can benefit from economic growth without anyone needing to 
take the risk to start a conflict. At the same time however, economic growth can increase 
grievances such as inequality and social instability as has been shown by some of the literature 
quoted above. This may lead to more opportunities for rebellion and conflict, especially when 
combined with difficult relations between ethnic groups.  
 Not only have economic circumstances changed, but also the kind of conflict that occurs 
in most countries is different. The greed hypothesis focuses on centralised rebellions in which one 
organised rebel group led by a specific political elite group attempts to subvert the state. This may 
indeed apply to some conflicts, but definitely not to all. Conflicts such as the 2007-08 Kenya 
crisis – the case-study of this paper – are not fought along such clear-cut lines. Instead, such 
conflicts are fought on a more local level with disorganised mobs doing the killing, as will be 
discussed in the later chapters of this thesis. The greed hypothesis focuses on nation-wide, or at 
least ethnicity-wide elites organising the violence (see e.g. Caselli & Coleman, 2006). Can the 
greed hypothesis logic be used to explain these more local outbursts of violence?  
   
 In order to test the four conditions established in this section and to see if the described 
weaknesses of the greed hypothesis are relevant, this thesis will do a case-study of a major 
conflict in an African country. For this, the case of Kenya’s 2007-08 post-election crisis will be 
used. This thesis will attempt to find out whether the greed hypothesis can be used to explain this 
conflict. It will use the hypothesis that the four conditions mentioned in the previous paragraph 
need to be present for an ethnic conflict to arise within a state, and that when these conditions are 
present even during times of economic growth conflict can be possible and even profitable for 
certain groups.  
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3 Background of the 2007-08 Kenya crisis 
 
 Kenya’s case is interesting because its conditions were completely unlike what the greed 
hypothesis focuses on. It has known ethnic conflict, most recently after the 2007 presidential 
election. But before this crisis, it was known as one of the most stable countries in Africa 
(Kagwanja & Southall 2009: p. 260). The country is democratic, knew relatively high economic 
growth in the years before the 2007 election, and has few natural resources of note. In other 
words, at first sight it seems to be exactly the kind of state where the greed hypothesis would not 
expect a conflict to arise. Yet still, conflict did occur. That conflict, however, was not like the 
ones the greed hypothesis focuses on: instead of a centralised rebel group fighting the 
government, the violence was more local in nature. How did this happen, and can the greed 
hypothesis provide good explanations for this? In order to find that out, this section will first give 
a short overview of Kenya’s ethnic and historical background, before moving on to the political 
and economic situation in 2007 to find possible explanations for the occurrence of the ethnic 
crisis. Then in the next chapters, this information will be further analysed in combination with the 
literature.  
 
3.1 Ethnicity in Kenya 
 Kenya is a highly diverse country. Its inhabitants are 
divided into numerous ethnic groups of varying sizes. 
According to Ethnologue, an institute recording languages 
throughout the world, the country features 67 live languages, 
with English and Swahili as the national languages (Ethnologue, 
2013). One thing that makes the Kenyan case interesting is that 
none of the ethnic groups encompass a majority of the 
population: there is no obvious majority group, just a lot of 
minorities. The largest ethnic group, going by data provided by 
the CIA, are the Kikuyu with just 22% of the population (CIA 
Factbook, 2013). Of the other ethnic groups, none encompass more than 15% of the population. In 
2009, a census was executed to get an overview of the population of the country, which was 
published in 2010. In this census, 24 main ethnic groups were recognised and the Kikuyu were 
again shown to be the largest, with 6,6 million, 17% of the total population (Oparanya, 2010: p. 
34-35). The difference between the data from the census and those from the CIA Factbook are 
because the CIA includes some closely affiliated tribes with the Kikuyu, while the census 
Name % of pop. 
Kikuyu 22% 
Luhya 14% 
Luo 13% 
Kalenjin 12% 
Kamba 11% 
Kisii 6% 
Meru 6% 
Other African 15% 
Non-African 1% 
Table 1: Ethnic groups in Kenya (source: 
CIA Factbook, 2013) 
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recorded these as separate from the Kikuyu. A complete overview of the largest ethnic groups 
according to the CIA can be found in table 1.  
 Historically, the different ethnic groups have been at odds at different times. The Kikuyu 
are often perceived by members of other 
ethnicities to be advantaged over the other 
groups: they are the wealthiest and best educated 
ethnic group in the country and dominate both 
the national politics and business (Smith, 2009: 
p. 880). The Kikuyu originate from the central 
part of Kenya, surrounding Mount Kenya, where 
Kenya’s capital of Nairobi is also located (BBC 
News, 2008). This central position gives them a 
great advantage. The other important groups are 
mostly located towards the west of the country: 
the Kalenjin who are the dominant ethnic group in the Rift Valley, the Luo who live in the 
Nyanza district, and the Luhya who live in the Western district. The Eastern and North-Eastern 
districts are less densely populated, the Somali majority there thus has relatively little political 
power. Because of this complex ethnic situation, ethnicity plays an important role in the daily life 
in Kenya.  
 
 Since ethnicity is so important in Kenya, the numerous grievances between the ethnic 
groups are highly precarious. The most important of these grievances is that the smaller groups 
feel the Kikuyu dominate the Kenyan politics and economics. The Kikuyu benefited from the 
British colonial rule, and retained their favoured position after independence in 1963 (Smith, 
2009: p. 880). As will be discussed further in the overview of Kenya’s history since 
independence, the KANU political party that controlled Kenya for almost 40 years was dominated 
by Kikuyu for much of its existence. This dominance has led to the fact that of the presidents 
Kenya has had, all but Moi were Kikuyu. Under the presidency of Kibaki leading up to the 2007 
elections, most of the important ministers were either Kikuyus or from the related Meru or Embu 
groups (Barkan, 2008: p. 2). Besides politics, according to academic Joel Barkan the businesses of 
Kenya were also dominated by the Kikuyu: as such, that group also profited most from the 
economic growth Kenya experienced in the years before the 2007 election (2008: p. 2).  
 Besides the Kikuyu domination of the government and economy, there were also various 
territory-related grievances amongst the smaller ethnic groups of the country (Kagwanja & 
Southall, 2009: p. 268-270). After decolonisation, the land formerly owned by the British was 
Figure 1: Map of Kenya’s ethnic groups (source: BBC News, 
2008). 
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given away in a government-sponsored program. But according to the opposition this program 
heavily favoured the Kikuyu, leading to the economic edge the group currently has over the rest 
of the population (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009: p. 269). Kikuyu land-owners gained land that was 
located in the middle of the other tribes’ territory. The various commissions on the issue of 
displacement “have stalled out, leaving land grievances to simmer, usually along ethnic or 
regional lines” (Smith, 2009: p. 882). In addition to this, groups of Kikuyu were settling in areas 
that were historically dominated by other groups and taking important positions there. Cities such 
as Kisumu, Eldoret and Nairobi are ethnically mixed, and it is here where the most serious 
grievances related to land or economic development are found (Smith, 2009: p. 870). These areas 
were to form important centres for conflict during the 2007-08 crisis (HRW, 2008: p. 35-36). The 
marginalisation of the smaller ethnic groups in Kenya, combined with historical inequalities and 
the Kikuyu domination of the national state and economy were important factors that played a 
role in the 2007-08 crisis (Smith, 2009: p. 885). These grievances are evident not only throughout 
the crisis, but also through the whole Kenyan history since independence, as will be seen in the 
next section. 
 
3.2 Politics in Kenya since independence 
 After Kenya became independent from Great-Britain in 1963, it soon established an all-
powerful presidency (Branch & Cheeseman, 2008: p. 6). Soon the KANU (Kenya African 
National Union) political party became dominant, winning the first election and the Kikuyu Jomo 
Kenyatta became the first president. Dominated by the Kikuyu ethnic group (Smith, 2009: p. 880), 
the KANU controlled the Kenyan politics for years. Soon after being elected, Kenyatta merged his 
party with the opposing KADU and proceeded to ban other opposition to his party, thus creating 
what was essentially a one-party system (Owuor, Nguyen & Kuria, 2008: p. 6). After Kenyatta 
died in 1978, his former vice-president Daniel arap Moi took over his position as leader of the 
KANU and president. In 1982, he officially made Kenya a one-party state, which it had been de 
facto for years (Owuor e.a., 2008: p. 6). Throughout his reign, Moi controlled the country’s 
economy and politics through use of the state’s power. What began as politics of elite consensus 
under Kenyatta ended up in coercion and fear holding together the system (Branch & Cheeseman, 
2008: p. 9). Moi also used the state’s resources to fund a clientelistic economic system, in which 
corruption was everywhere. During this time, the Kikuyu elite was gradually replaced by Moi’s 
Kalenjin supporters (Branch & Cheeseman, 2008: p. 8). In 1990, protests erupted against the one-
party system which were violently broken up. However, due to continued protests and 
international pressure Moi relented in 1991 and re-instated the multi-party system. In practice, this 
meant little: Moi still won the 1992 elections against a divided opposition, even though those 
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elections were controversial (Gibson & Long, 2009: p. 1). In the following years, due to both 
domestic and international pressure, President Moi continued to reform the political system of 
Kenya. The 1997 elections were the most credible and free ones than any the country had 
previously seen, but due to divisions in the opposition Moi again won (Owuor e.a., 2008: p. 7).  
 
 In years following the 1997 elections a constitutional amendment was passed that 
disallowed Moi from running for president again, as he had served too many terms already. Moi 
accepted this and stepped down at the end of his final term, naming Uhuru Kenyatta as his 
successor and leader of the KANU. However, Kenyatta faced a serious and united opposition by 
the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). The NARC was led by the Kikuyu Mwai Kibaki but 
also included non-Kikuyu’s such as Kalonzo Musyoka from the Eastern District and Raila 
Odinga, a Luo. In the terms of ethnic alliances according to which elections were historically 
fought, this was an alliance of Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009: p. 267). This 
coalition was focused on the promise of change: it would alter the outdated constitution and 
democratise the country further (Smith, 2009: p. 879). In addition to this, Kibaki and Odinga 
promised to address various social and economic issues, as well as increase access to education 
for children (Gibson & Long, 2009: p. 1). The NARC won the 2002 presidential election, which 
was deemed by international observers to be fair and open (Owuor e.a., 2008: p. 7). Mwai Kibaki 
became the new president while the KANU was in the opposition for the first time since 
independence. This peaceful election of a non-incumbent was seen by some as a confirmation of 
Kenya’s movement towards a successful democracy (Mueller, 2011: p. 101). Unfortunately, the 
stability was not to last. Kibaki did not name Odinga as a minister, nor did he give enough 
positions in his cabinet to members of parties in the coalition other than his own. The NARC soon 
fell apart: Raila Odinga and other prominent members of the coalition felt betrayed by Kibaki’s 
refusal to name them as members of the government and left the coalition due to both personal 
conflicts and political disagreements (Smith, 2009: p. 879-880). This disagreement broke all trust 
between Kibaki and Odinga, and set the stage for the later 2007 election. Odinga formed the 
Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), a multi-ethnic party to oppose Kibaki’s government. The 
government’s proposal for a revised constitution was offered in a referendum to the people of 
Kenya, but it was voted away, partly due to intense campaigning by the ODM (Gibson & Long, 
2009: p. 2). This lack of constitutional reform left the old system of the KANU still in place. 
Coercive and oppressive institutions were still fully controlled by the president, and Kibaki made 
good use of that to strengthen his own position (Branch & Cheeseman, 2008: p. 17). However, 
despite his failure to deliver political reform, Kibaki’s government did manage to improve the 
economic conditions of the country. The economy he inherited from Moi was outdated, had a 
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negative growth rate as well as high unemployment and poverty, but Kibaki’s government 
managed to turn this around (Gibson & Long, 2009: p. 2). By 2007, the country experienced an 
economic growth of 7%. Against this backdrop of economic growth yet political instability, the 
2007 presidential elections took place.  
 
3.3 The PNU and ODM election campaigns 
 In the 2007 presidential elections, the stakes were high. The ODM of Raila Odinga had 
campaigned hard against the ruling government led by Kibaki during its term in power, and 
Kibaki used the power of the state to strengthen his own position. Nothing was left of the alliance 
between the two sides that once formed the NARC. In 2007, Odinga decided to run against Kibaki 
for the presidency. Kibaki had re-formed his political party under the name Party of National 
Unity (PNU) and ran to be re-elected. Meanwhile, Kalonzo Musyoka further complicated things 
by running for presidency as well, forming a split party of the ODM: the ODM-K. However, he 
was never really in sight of winning the elections, and Kibaki and Odinga remained the two main 
candidates. A tough election campaign followed, where both parties used ethnic tensions to 
mobilise their constituencies (Mueller, 2011: p. 104-105; Gibson & Long, 2009: p. 3).  
 
 Presidential candidate Odinga mobilised his followers based on a tough campaign 
proclaiming it was time for reform. The ODM focused on the perceived shortcomings of Kibaki’s 
government: their populist message was aimed at the masses, accusing Kibaki of ignoring the 
poor in favour of the existing elite of the country (Gibson & Long, 2009: p. 2). Furthermore, 
Odinga made corruption a key issue: he claimed Kibaki had not done anything about corruption, 
and even allowed it to persist and benefit his favoured elite (Gibson & Long, 2009: p. 3). There 
was a strong ethnic appeal to Odinga’s campaign. He claimed he would end the ‘economic 
apartheid’ favouring the Kikuyu over the other ethnic groups of Kenya (Kagwanja & Southall, 
2009: p. 265). Part of this would be an attempt to end the land-related grievances such as the ones 
described earlier in this chapter, where post-colonial reforms of land-ownership were seen to have 
benefited Kikuyu over local tribes. The ODM portrayed the election as an ethnic struggle of 41 
ethnic groups against one, the Kikuyu (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009: p. 265). Significantly, Odinga 
was strongly in favour of decentralisation of the Kenyan state. He claimed he would introduce a 
‘majimbo’ institutional setting that would be more federal in nature: the provinces would gain 
power at the expense of the central state (Cheeseman, 2008: p. 175). This had long been a desire 
from ethnic groups such as the Luo and the Kalenjin, while the existing (Kikuyu-dominated) elite 
had always opposed it. Majimboism is a loaded term in Kenyan politics, which not only refers to 
installing a federal state with more power for the regions, but is also associated with plans to 
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ethnically cleanse the regions of all but their ‘native’ ethnic groups (Cheeseman, 2008: p. 175). 
With many Kikuyu living in Kalenjin and Luo areas such as the Rift Valley and holding fertile 
land there – which was part of the land grievances – many ‘native’ inhabitants of these provinces 
liked the idea of more local power. At the same time this also – falsely – gave them the idea that 
the Odinga government would ethnically cleanse their areas after a victory in the elections and 
give the tribes back their lands (HRW, 2008: p. 36). This raised ethnic tensions, especially as 
Kikuyu and other PNU supporters strongly opposed all majimbo plans.  
 Opposing Odinga’s program, Kibaki’s PNU attempted to emphasise the high growth-rates 
the country had known under Kibaki’s rule, in order to appeal to the growing middle classes 
(Gibson & Long, 2009: p. 2). Furthermore, Kibaki promised to increase the now mostly universal 
primary school coverage to include secondary schooling as well. However, as with the ODM’s, 
the PNU’s campaign was mostly focused on ethnic arguments. Kibaki launched an aggressive 
campaign and attempted to mobilise the Kikuyu’s fears of being marginalised in favour of other 
groups. The proposed majimbo policies of Odinga mobilised his opponents as well as his allies: 
PNU supporters likened the policies with tribalism and opposed them strongly (Cheeseman 2008: 
p. 175). Kibaki portrayed the federalist ideas of his opponent as one step towards the 
fragmentation of Kenya. If Odinga’s ODM was the reform candidate of the election, the PNU as 
the party with the incumbent president attempted to continue the status quo and gain the support 
of those who profited from Kibaki’s rule. 
 
 An exceptionally tough election campaign from both sides followed. Susanne Mueller 
quotes a Kenyan newspaper article claiming both sides described each other as “ethnic demons” 
(2008: p. 202). The two opponents “charged the other with using tribal appeals while boasting of 
their own multi-ethnic credentials” (Gibson & Long, 2009: p. 3). Odinga attempted to attract 
votes beyond his Luo base by having a Luhya as his vice-presidential candidate and by using the 
support of Kalenjin William Ruto, but Kibaki did the same and his campaign also featured high-
profile supporters from the Luhya and Kalenjin groups. In the end, the PNU was mostly supported 
by the Kikuyu and the closely related Embu and Meru, the Kisii and part of the Luhya, while the 
ODM consisted of an alliance between the Luo, Kalenjin and another part of the Luhya 
(Kagwanja & Southall, 2009: p. 267). These two ethnic alliances went head to head in a closely 
fought election, the campaign for which was not based on programmatic politics, but instead 
purely on ethnicity and clientelist relations between ethnicities and the political parties (Mueller, 
2011: p. 104-105). All this led to a high-stakes election that would eventually end up in violence.  
 
Master thesis – Mobilising Grievances 
Diallo Nijburg, s1309749 
25 
 
3.4 The 2007 election and subsequent crisis 
 After a long and tough campaign, in December 2007 the general elections in Kenya were 
finally held. Although the voting process generally went fine – despite a number of problems – 
the tallying of the vote was highly controversial. According to a report on the elections by Human 
Rights Watch, the tallying was subject to a huge fraud by the Electoral Commission of Kenya, 
who oversaw a process in which over a million votes for Odinga disappeared (HRW, 2008: p. 21-
22). According to Gibson and Long, based on the exit polls these missing votes should have 
resulted in a victory for Odinga, not Kibaki (2009: p. 3-4). This is also reflected in the results of 
the parliamentary elections, which were held at the same time. Here, Odinga’s ODM won 99 seats 
compared to the PNU’s 43. Instantly, both domestic and international institutions called the vote 
count flawed and doubted the results (Gibson & Long, 2009: p. 3). Despite these objections, 
Kibaki attempted to prevent any challenge and had himself sworn in within hours after the result 
was announced. Journalists were sent away and public broadcasts suspended in attempts to keep 
the peace, but all this only contributed to the unrest (HRW, 2008: p. 22-23). Soon, riots began and 
the 2007-08 crisis was born. The conflict had far reaching consequences: between 1,000 and 
2,000 Kenyans died, with a further 600,000 displaced, and enormous economic and political 
damage was done (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009: p. 260).  
 
 Although often going unnoticed, there was already violence well before the elections. 
Beginning in August 2007, violence had on multiple occasions erupted and caused 200 deaths and 
led to the displacement of 70,000 people (HRW, 2008: p. 19). Some of this was in-party conflict 
over who would get the party nominations, but other violent incidents were between different 
ethnic groups. According to Human Rights Watch, the response by the police to these violent 
conflicts was insufficient (HRW, 2008: p. 19-20). Furthermore, “[s]everal politicians and local 
leaders were implicated in this violence” (HRW, 2008: p. 20), yet little to no actions were taken 
against them.  
 All the violence leading up to the election was nothing compared to what came after 
through. That post-election violence was not in all cases a spontaneous response to the rigging of 
the elections. In Eldoret for instance, local leaders and ODM organisers called for war against the 
Kikuyu in case the PNU was declared the winner of the elections, since according to them that 
would signify that the elections were rigged (HRW, 2008: p. 37). After the elections, throughout 
the Rift Valley – the province mostly inhabited by the Kalenjin – conflicts emerged, particularly 
on places where there was a significant Kikuyu minority. Angry mobs of Kalenjin targeted 
Kikuyu and other ethnic groups in the area, as well as anyone who was affiliated with the PNU. 
Many were injured or killed, numerous houses were burned and thousands of people were 
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displaced and forced to leave their homes (Waki Report, 2008: p. 60). In some cases, the Kikuyu 
in the Rift Valley attempted to defend themselves against the attacking mobs, and in some cases 
undertook violent reprisal attacks (HRW, 2008: p. 42-43). Particularly in cities in the Rift Valley 
where the Kikuyu were in the majority, attacks on Luo, Kalenjin or other ODM supporters were 
commonplace. Violent gangs were implied to be involved in these reprisal attacks (HRW, 2008: 
p. 43). The police and military were unable to control the violence, which continued to spiral out 
of control. In other areas conflict erupted as well. The demonstrations in Nyanza Province – the 
home district of Odinga – were initially peaceful, but the police crackdown on the protestors was 
unnecessarily harsh according to later government reports, causing the conflict to become violent 
(Waki Report, 2009: p. 61-62). This was not the only case where the response by the police 
caused the conflict to intensify: in most cases where the police intervened their actions were either 
insufficient or only aggravated the conflict further (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009: p. 260). In the 
Western Province, too, there was violence against the Kikuyu and other minorities (Waki Report, 
2009: p. 60-61).  
 When displaced people from the Rift Valley travelled into the Central Province – up until 
that moment unstable yet largely without violent incidents – the already tense ethnic relations in 
that region boiled over (HRW Report, 2008: p. 55). Members of different ethnic groups from the 
Kikuyu majority in the province were in many cases threatened to leave the area. Many did so, but 
in some cases violent conflict erupted after all. The Mungiki gang played a large role in the 
conflict here (Waki Report, 2009: p. 64). The Mungiki gang is a violent group with a Kikuyu 
allegiance that is active in Nairobi and the Central province. It is often said to have ties to several 
prominent politicians, although little to no proof has been found of this (HRW, 2008: p. 43-44). 
Other provinces, like the Coast Province, also knew ethnic conflicts during this period. However, 
the main centre of the conflict was located in the Rift Valley as well as in the Nyanza and Nairobi 
provinces. The local attacks and conflicts were responses to each other and conflict in one area 
exacerbated violence in others, but there were little to no large-scale attacks over the borders of 
the different provinces (HRW, 2008). All these local conflicts combined, though, caused a lot of 
devastation throughout the country. 
 
 On February 28, a power-sharing agreement between the PNU and the ODM was finally 
signed, ending the conflict. Mediated first by John Kofuor, later by Kofi Annan and eventually 
Oluyemi Adeniji, this peace would allow Kibaki to become president after all, but his power was 
limited due to the addition of the Prime Minister, the office Odinga took. The conflict had lasted 
less than 3 months, yet the results were disastrous for Kenya. After the peace was signed, two 
commissions were installed to find the causes of the violence. The Independent Review 
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Commission was led by judge Johann Kriegler and produced a report – generally referred to as the 
Kriegler Report – that criticised Kenya’s institutional design and election procedures as part of the 
causes of the war (Kriegler report, 2009). Similarly, the Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election 
Violence was chaired by Philip Waki and attempted to investigate how the clashes could occur 
and what the causes and results of the violence were. The Waki Report concluded a total of 1,133 
people were killed in the post-election violence (2009: p. 56), while many more were displaced. 
The damage to Kenya was huge, and many were left wondering how this could have happened.  
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4 Greed and grievance in Kenya’s crisis 
 
 In the theoretical framework earlier in this thesis, it has been established that there are four 
conditions for a violent (ethnic) conflict to arise. To repeat, these are: (1) the presence of 
perceived grievances on the basis of which ethnic groups can be mobilised; (2) a political elite 
with the capability of mobilising the ethnic group(s) that has an economic interest in promoting 
the conflict; (3) economic resources that can be captured for use by the rebel groups to finance 
their struggle; and (4) a government that is weak enough for the rebellion to be potentially 
successful. However, these conditions are focused upon organised conflict between a centralised 
rebel group and a state. What the Kenya case offers is a different kind of violence: local and 
diffuse in nature. Do the conditions still apply for this kind of violent conflict? This section of the 
thesis will see if all four of the conditions were present in Kenya ahead of the 2007-08 crisis, thus 
combining the theory with the practice. In this way, the thesis will test the theory by seeing how 
the mechanisms found in the literature work in practice. At the same time, this will shed a further 
light upon the 2007-08 Kenya crisis, giving theoretical explanations on what caused it. This 
section will start with the first of the four conditions: the presence of ethnic grievances. 
 
4.1 Ethnic grievances in Kenya 
 According to the greed literature, people who enter a conflict are not motivated by 
grievances. Inequality, oppression, and other injustices are just an excuse used by leaders of 
rebellions to justify their cause and mobilise their followers (Collier, 2006: p. 1-2). But that does 
not mean grievances are unimportant. As was claimed in the theoretical framework, the presence 
of grievances is one of the requirements for a rebellion or other civil conflict to arise. According 
to Collier, mobilising ethnic groups on the basis of grievances allows the leaders of those groups 
to fight their wars (2006: p. 22). Thus, if the greed hypothesis really explains how violence erupts, 
some ethnic grievances should have been present in Kenya ahead of the 2007 elections. These 
grievances must then have been activated by ethnic leaders, who used them to get their 
constituents to fight a war that benefited the leaders economically. So the first step in this remains 
the presence of the grievances themselves. What were these grievances in Kenya’s case?  
 
 Perhaps the main grievance that the smaller ethnic groups had was the idea that the 
Kikuyu ethnic group was in a better position than any other group, dominating politics, the media 
and the economy (Barkan, 2008: p. 2). As was seen earlier, the Kikuyu had an advantageous 
position during the British colonial rule and managed to stay in power after independence (Smith, 
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2009: p. 880). The leading ethnic alliances that have ruled Kenya almost without exception at 
least included the Kikuyu. President Kibaki was a Kikuyu, as were most of the important 
ministers in Kibaki’s cabinet. This was despite the fact that the alliance with Odinga’s Luo played 
a vital role in winning the 2002 presidential election for Kibaki (Barkan, 2008: p. 2) Many 
members of other ethnic groups felt the Kibaki government favoured the Kikuyu over all other 
groups. During the election campaign for the 2007 elections, Odinga even referred to an 
“economic apartheid” favouring the Kikuyu and giving them all the privileges (Kagwanja & 
Southall, 2009: p. 265). The Kikuyu’s dominance is only enhanced by them controlling the 
Central Province of Kenya, while also being the largest ethnic group in the capitol of Nairobi. All 
this led to increased calls for ‘majimboism’ amongst the other ethnic groups which, as has been 
discussed in the previous section, is a highly controversial form of tribal federalism. The 
controversy surrounding majimboism was one of the factors that increased tensions surrounding 
the elections.  
 Besides the Kikuyu domination of the government and economy, there were also various 
territory-related grievances amongst the smaller ethnic groups of the country (Kagwanja & 
Southall, 2009: p. 268-270). After decolonisation, still some 20% of the land – often the most 
fertile agricultural grounds – was owned by the British. A government sponsored program 
allowed the land to be sold to Kenyan buyers, instead of giving it back to the tribal groups that 
had collectively owned the land before colonial times (HRW, 2008: p. 13). Then-president 
Kenyatta used the land to build alliances, and much of it ended up in the hands of Kikuyu. This 
led many Kikuyu to settle in areas such as the Rift Valley outside of their home areas; a “Kikuyu 
diaspora 100 miles west of the Kikuyu homeland around Mt. Kenya” and right in the middle of 
Kalenjin lands (Barkan, 2008: p. 3). According to members of the opposition this unequal division 
of the land seriously benefited the Kikuyu elite (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009: p. 269). This was 
just one more episode in a long history of land displacement and territorial conflicts along ethnic 
lines, which were not adequately responded to by the government (Smith, 2009). Issues like these 
have caused local ‘land defence forces’ to arise, armed groups that defend their ethnicity’s 
territory against others (Smith, 2009). These land defence forces are important in the conflict, 
since the presence of these meant there was a pre-existing capacity for violence. These armed 
groups were already present and ready to defend their land, or attack other ethnic groups if 
necessary. Because of this, the conflict could spiral out of control faster (Smith, 2009). The role of 
land as a grievance is particularly interesting in relation to the greed hypothesis since – in addition 
to being highly symbolic and important for ethnic groups – it is one of the most valuable 
resources Kenya has (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009: p. 264-265). Although most greed scholars 
focus on oil and minerals as the main resources to motivate conflict (e.g. Krause and Suzuki, 
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2005; and De Soysa, 2002), other resources may also be relevant. A high reliance on agriculture 
may be relevant in predicting civil conflict as found by Gissinger & Gleditsch (1999: p. 353-254) 
not only because it signals a weak government and economy, but also because as in the Kenya 
case land and ethnicity are inherently linked. Because of this combination of a high economic 
value of the land and its important role in the ethnic tribes’ culture and heritage, the Kenyan 
grievances surrounding land were very important in motivating the conflict.  
 
 Other grievances played important roles as well. Poverty and inequality were (and still 
are) common in Kenya: many communities have done better than others in the process of 
economic development. This has caused feelings of jealousy, particularly when the inequalities 
have occurred along ethnic lines (Waki Report, 2009: p. 51). In addition, access to resources such 
as education was not shared evenly between ethnic groups and the Kikuyu were again perceived 
to have gotten the better deal in this regard (Barkan, 2008: p. 2). As scholars such as Matuszeski 
and Schneider discuss, this kind of unequal access to public services is a significant risk factor for 
civil conflict (2006: p. 19-20).  
 There were thus numerous ethnic grievances amongst Kenya’s ethnic groups. These 
grievances were largely ignored by the political elite throughout the years (Smith, 2009: p. 870). 
During previous crises, such as those surrounding the 1992 and 1997 elections, these grievances 
exploded into violent conflict, but never to the extent they did in 2007 and 2008. For years before 
the crisis, nothing had changed in the grievances: the Kikuyu had occupied their advantageous 
position for years, the land grievances were never addressed, and inequality was always present. 
And yet, at one sudden point all these grievances were activated and the crisis ensued. This 
supports the greed hypothesis’ argument that grievances alone are not enough to start a violent 
conflict. The question then becomes: what caused the long-standing grievances to ignite into 
violence during the 2007-08 crisis? 
 
4.2 Mobilisation of grievances by the elite 
 The grievances described in the previous section were long present, but for decades they 
rarely played up. During the early parts of the KANU’s rule, the country’s elite was united and 
saw no reason to instigate ethnic tensions (Branch & Cheeseman, 2008: p. 6-7). The elites were 
dependent on the KANU and its structures to protect their wealth. When these elites fragmented, 
governments and ethnic alliances became less stable and violence was more commonplace, but 
even under Moi’s rule the elite remained largely united due to his use of the state’s coercive force 
(Branch & Cheeseman, 2008: p. 8-9). In the 2002 elections, a new ethnic alliance arose, but the 
presence of the Kikuyu in this alliance as well as its overwhelming victory in the general elections 
Master thesis – Mobilising Grievances 
Diallo Nijburg, s1309749 
31 
 
ensured that for a while the country remained stable. However, during the time leading up to the 
2007 election, this changed. The elite that had won the 2002 election fell apart: the Kikuyu under 
Kibaki formed the government, while Odinga and his Luo formed an opposition to them. Thus, 
nothing changed in the grievances between the ethnic groups, yet they were activated: presidential 
candidate Kibaki and Odinga mobilised their followers on ethnic grounds. As was described in the 
previous chapter of this thesis, the campaign that followed was harsh and full of arguments based 
on ethnicity. This is in line with what the greed hypothesis proposes: ethnicities are mobilised into 
entering a conflict by political elites (Caselli & Coleman, 2006). In Kenya’s case, this can clearly 
be seen. The whole election campaign was based on ethnicity, with both sides aiming to mobilise 
their ethnic group as best as they could (Mueller, 2011: p. 104-105). However, there are some 
problems with this linking of the greed hypothesis with what happened in Kenya. First of all, the 
people who mobilised the grievances were trying to win an election first of all, not trying to form 
a rebel organisation to subvert the government. And second, the greed hypothesis claims that the 
leaders who mobilise their ethnic groups will do so in order to achieve some kind of economic 
goal (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009: p. 30). What would that goal be in the case of Kenya, what 
kind of economic gain can be won through mobilising the ethnic grievances?  
 
 What is vital in understanding the Kenya conflict is how Kenya’s politics have always 
been a game of alliances between ethnic groups. As was described earlier in this thesis, the ethnic 
alliances of the PNU and the ODM were pitched against each other in the election. According to 
Mueller, the two sides believed that the winner of this election would determine which ethnic 
groups would gain access to the state’s resources (2011: p. 104-105). In other words, the election 
was a zero-sum game where one party – and one ethnic coalition – would gain all power and the 
related benefits (Mueller, 2011). This is because of the institutional design of Kenya’s 
government: due to the lack of constitutional reform the all-powerful presidency that was installed 
by Kenyatta and Moi was never removed. The parliament and other institutions were powerless 
compared to the president, who thus went unchecked. This meant that the winner of the 
presidential election would essentially rule the country alone. That this significantly influenced 
the outbreak of violence after the elections was also confirmed by Smith (2009). The importance 
of this was confirmed in the Kriegler Report after the election: that report made an extensive case 
in support of constitutional reform, particularly concerning the election procedures. For instance, 
the president controls the electoral commission, and thus can significantly influence the outcome 
of the elections (Kriegler Report, 2009: p. 4-5). This directly led to the rigging of the 2007 
elections (HRW, 2008). The promise of control over the state was a powerful economic motivator 
for both sides. This makes perfect sense from a theoretical point of view: as the theory has shown, 
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gaining control over the state can be an important motivator for political elites to mobilise their 
constituents (see e.g. Grossman, 1999). This is even more relevant in Kenya, where the all-
powerful presidency and widespread corruption allow for huge economic gains for the ruling 
party. Thus, both sides desperately wanted to win and did everything they could to do so, 
including mobilising ethnic grievances. This combination of ethnic alliances and a winner-takes-
all institutional design made campaigning on ethnicity almost inevitable (Smith, 2009) and the 
hard campaign described in the previous chapter followed.  
 In the election campaigns by the PNU and the ODM, the ethnic grievances that existed 
were mobilised in order to gain electoral support. But how did the country go from a relatively 
peaceful struggle to win the elections to a violent conflict? The greed theory would expect that the 
losing party would continue their electoral struggle through other means. However, there is little 
to no evidence of the direct involvement of either Kibaki or Odinga in the riots (HRW, 2008). 
This may seem curious, since they should be the people who had most to gain from winning the 
elections: they would become president and gain access to the state’s resources. But besides the 
two candidates, more minor members of the political parties had important interests as well. The 
PNU leaders feared of losing their advantageous position. Kikuyu, in particular, were well aware 
of Odinga’s plans of ending their dominance in the government and business and were hoping to 
stay in that position (Mueller, 2008: p. 201). Furthermore, the Kikuyu elite had much to lose in 
Odinga’s anti-corruption efforts, which could see many of them accused if successfully executed 
(Branch & Cheeseman, 2008: p. 19). This is because many influential Kikuyu had been involved 
in some forms of corruption during the Kibaki years and earlier. The perpetrators of corruption 
and other forms of looting of public resources had been protected by Kibaki’s government in 
exchange for support, and a change in president would make their position highly precarious 
(HRW, 2008: p. 64). These high stakes for the PNU leaders made sure they wanted to avoid 
losing at all costs. Thus, it seems likely that the rigging of the elections was directly caused by 
this, and even Kibaki himself is not entirely without blame in this (HRW, 2008). The rigging of 
the elections may have added another grievance to the already large list present at the time, but 
did this directly cause the conflict? 
 
 The post-election violence started, as described earlier, in the Rift Valley where Kalenjin 
mobs attacked Kikuyu and other PNU supporters in their region. Following the greed hypothesis, 
one would expect these attacks to have clear leaders who have much to gain from the riots 
economically. To some extent, this is true. However, for the leaders of these initial riots it is 
necessary not to look to the top of the ODM, but further down its hierarchy. Human Rights Watch 
implicated numerous local ODM campaigners in the riots (HRW, 2008: p. 37). What did these 
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have to gain from the riots? It is likely they had hoped to benefit from their party winning the 
presidential elections, since it would give them better chances of entering a high-profile position 
in national, provincial or even local government. In Kenya, there are huge economic advantages 
to having a position in the employment of the government: the wages in the government are very 
high, with even members of parliament earning $190,000 per year untaxed (Mueller, 2008: p. 
200). In a society with high poverty and unemployment, those are significant figures. Even more 
important are the interests of local leaders in the Rift Valley – a category that on many occasions 
overlaps with that of low- to mid-level ODM officials. Many local leaders were involved in the 
post-election violence (HRW, 2008: p. 37), and they had much to gain from it. The ODM had 
promised to settle the old land-grievances and many Kalenjin thought that meant the lands in the 
Rift Valley owned by Kikuyu would be returned to them (HRW, 2008: p. 36). Since land is a 
highly valuable resource in Kenya, this may have been a significant motivation for these local 
leaders. Their attempts to force the Kikuyu out of their lands were in most cases successful and 
even after the conflict was ended many did not dare to return, leaving large areas including the 
major city of Eldoret almost completely free of Kikuyu presence (HRW, 2008: p. 56).  
 The question has to be asked whether control over the land was an economic motivator 
only. Land is – both in Kenya and elsewhere in the world – tied to the tribes and has a great 
symbolic value for the people: without land, a tribe is nothing. Perhaps this symbolic value was 
more important to the people of the Rift Valley than its economic worth. Here, the greed 
hypothesis is at a loss. Putting the symbolic value of the land ahead of material gain is irrational 
according to the way of thinking the greed hypothesis applies. A defender of the greed hypothesis 
might say that the symbolic value, again, just serves to hide the economic motivations the local 
leaders have. The local leaders would furthermore increase their own power through extending the 
land held by their tribe. However, the symbolic and tribal value of land should not be discounted 
in an analysis of Kenya’s crisis. This may be a weakness in the greed hypothesis, since its focus 
on economic interests reduces the focus on these – strictly speaking irrational – tribal incentives.  
 
 Thus, both the high-ranking politicians in both the PNU and the ODM and local leaders 
had significant economic interests in the ethnic conflict. Although it is not proven fact that the 
leaders of the political parties were promoting the conflict, they did little to stop it and there is 
even evidence some leaders were more actively involved (HRW, 2008). This included, for 
instance, unnamed PNU ministers (HRW, 2008: p. 45). From both sides of the conflict there are 
currently major leaders on trial in the International Criminal Court for their involvement in the 
conflict, including current president and Kikuyu Uhuru Kenyatta and prominent Kalenjin William 
Ruto. Still, there was no united and single-minded elite mobilising and leading the population. 
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Various local leaders were the people organising and in many cases funding the conflict. Their 
goals may also not have been exclusively materialistic. The value of the land for the tribe instead 
of for the individual seems to have been at least as important as its economic value. In summary, 
mobilisation of the masses did not happen in the way the greed hypothesis predicts: instead of the 
presidential candidates mobilising their groups and leading them into conflict, others lower on the 
party hierarchy profited from the mobilisation of ethnic grievances and used the violence to reach 
their goals.  
 
4.3 Economic resources and funding of the conflict 
 The third of the four conditions for violent ethnic conflict is all about the funding of the 
conflict. How a conflict is funded is a crucial question for the greed hypothesis: without funding, 
there can be no conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002b). In the previous section we saw that land as 
an economic resource was an important motivation for the conflict, certainly on a local level. 
However, land does not have an inherent value high enough to finance a conflict according to the 
literature (Fearon & Laitin, 2003: p. 87). So if not by land and not through other natural resources 
– since Kenya is not rich in oil or minerals – how then was the violence funded? The theory gives 
two potential alternatives: donations from diasporas, and support from foreign governments 
hostile to the rebel state’s government (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002b). Neither of these makes much 
sense in the Kenyan context. This is because the greed hypothesis focuses on conflict as in the 
fight of a rebel group against a government. In Kenya, as in many ethnic conflicts, the violence 
was far less organised than that: mobs and local militias did the fighting, not a centralised rebel 
army. The police and military did interfere on some occasions and certainly influenced the crisis 
but the main conflict was between ethnic groups, not between a rebel group and the government. 
Thus, different and more local methods of funding were required.  
 The mobs that attacked Kikuyu and PNU supporters in the Rift Valley and Nyanza 
Province as well as those that attacked Luo, Kalenjin and ODM supporters in the Central Province 
and Nairobi were mostly organised and funded locally (HRW, 2008: p. 4). For this, local 
businessmen and other members of the local elite invested their own money, in some cases even 
paying by the head for each member of the opposite tribes that was killed (HRW, 2008: p. 48). In 
many cases, extortion of supporters of the other party was used to gain access to additional funds 
(HRW, 2008: p. 42). The involvement of the Mungiki gang, a violent gang with a Kikuyu origin, 
further provided funding and other support for locals to attack their neighbours (Waki Report, 
2009: p. 51-52). In some cases, there is evidence of funding from party officials, members of 
parliament and even government ministers (HRW, 2008). Some of the violence was not funded 
for by any particular means: the looting that took place in all provinces may have provided ample 
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motivation for people to take part in the mobs (Waki Report, 2009: p. 58-65). Due to the often 
local nature of the violence, there was little need for great amounts of funding to conduct the 
attacks. The combination of support from local businessmen and elites, extortion, the involvement 
of violent gangs, donations from high-ranking party members and gains from looting were enough 
to fund the conflict.  
 
 One of the reasons there was not much need for major sources of funding for the mobs 
may be found in the economic conditions at the time of the 2007-08 crisis. The economy was 
growing, with a growth rate of 7% in 2007, but many Kenyans had barely profited from this. 
Particularly in the urban slums many people were still living in great poverty, which made the 
decision to turn to violence easier for them (Waki Report, 2009: p. 51). Furthermore, there was 
high unemployment especially amongst the youth in Kenya. These unemployed youths often 
found their way into violent gangs, which were then used by politicians and others in the ethnic 
violence (Waki Report, 2009: p. 51-52). Even besides the influence of gangs, the jobless were 
significantly easier to recruit for ethnic violence than people with day jobs. As a Kikuyu youth put 
it in an interview with Human Rights Watch: “[i]t was arranged by people with money, they 
bought the jobless like me. We need something to eat every day” (HRW, 2008: p. 45). This kind 
of thinking is in line with the greed hypothesis. Difficult economic circumstances lower the 
opportunity costs of entering the conflict as the risk of lost wages is lower than the potential gains 
of the violence (Bohlken & Sergenti, 2010: p. 952). Thus, with economic circumstances 
favourable for conflict, a low cost of mobilising and paying the mobs and multiple sources of 
funding available, the third condition for a violent ethnic conflict is also met. However, the nature 
of this conflict is different from what the greed hypothesis normally studies, making an analysis of 
the funding of the violence strictly through the greed literature hard.  
 
4.4 Government weakness 
 The fourth and final condition for an ethnic conflict to start is that the government should 
be weak. This is because a powerful government would make any rebellion less likely to succeed, 
while a weaker government is far more easily subverted (Fearon & Laitin, 2003: p. 75-76). This 
not only applies directly to the government’s military and police strength, but also to its financial 
power and governance capacity. A government with a strong military and police force will be far 
harder to defeat by a rebel movement, thus raising the risk and the costs of rebellion. Similarly, 
financially strong governments can attract support using its monetary and other economic means, 
while governance capacity is required for military and financial strength to be used effectively. 
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Thus, the greed hypothesis would expect that rebellions and other conflicts only arise where the 
government is relatively weak. Was this the case in Kenya ahead of its crisis? 
 
 Kenya’s governance institutions during the 2007-08 crisis were still based on the old post-
colonial ones that were formed by presidents Kenyatta and Moi, since attempts to reform these 
had failed. The old and often weak institutions significantly contributed to the crisis. Due to the 
lack of democratic control over the president, he could freely appoint whomever he wanted to 
important government positions. In this way president Kibaki had been able to change the 
members of the Electoral Commission of Kenya to his supporters, after which the Commission 
proceeded to rig the results in favour of Kibaki (HRW, 2008: p. 21-22). In a more strongly 
developed democratic state, this would not have occurred as the Electoral Commission would be 
neutral. Not only this, institutional weakness also allowed corruption to become rampant 
throughout Kenya’s government, which as was seen earlier played an important role in causing 
the conflict (Gibson & Long, 2009: p. 3). Democracy was not fully developed in the minds of the 
population either: the election was still contested in terms of ethnic alliances, and rarely was about 
the content of the different policies proposed by the candidates (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009: p. 
267). Furthermore, it was the all-powerful presidency and the winner-takes-all nature of the 
Kenyan election that raised the importance of the elections high enough that neither side could 
afford to lose (Mueller, 2011). In the terms of the greed hypothesis, this means that the 
institutional design of the Kenyan government raised the risks of losing the elections, increased 
the potential gains through conflict and thus made a violent end to the elections more likely. After 
the conflict was over, all of the Human Rights Watch report (2008), the Waki Report (2009) and 
the Kriegler report (2009) called for serious institutional reform to address the problems that 
occurred during and after the 2007 election.  
 
 Not only was the institutional design of the government a factor in the civil conflict, the 
response by the government on both national and local levels in many cases further aggravated the 
conflict (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009: p. 260). The interventions by police and military often 
either led to more violence or were completely ineffective in countering the mobs (HRW, 2008). 
The Waki Report accused the police and other security forces of “unjustified use of force and 
causing death and injury unnecessarily” and in some cases even “descending into acts of serious 
crime against civilians” (2009: p. 54). In other cases, the police stood idly by while attacks took 
place, despite being warned in advance (Mueller, 2008: p. 203). The police was incapable of 
dealing with the violence, and responded in an inconsistent and often ineffective manner to the 
riots (HRW, 2008: p. 59-62). Police forces as well as the army clearly lacked the ability to keep 
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law and order in a difficult time (Smith, 2009: p. 886). It is thus clear that institutional weakness 
on the side of the police and military aggravated the conflict, as predicted by the greed hypothesis.  
 The response to the attacks by the national government also fell short. When the first riots 
occurred, the national government under Kibaki unconstitutionally banned all public gatherings 
and told police to intervene where demonstrations took place. This set the stage for further 
violence between police and opposition supporters (HRW, 2008: p. 63). Additionally, the 
government under Kibaki took weeks before it finally gave in to domestic and international 
pressure and started negotiations with the other parties (HRW, 2008: p. 59). These ineffective 
responses by the government lengthened the conflict.  
 
 The weakness of Kenya’s institutions was an important factor in causing and aggravating 
the conflict. The institutional design of Kenya’s government raised the stakes for the participating 
parties through the all-powerful presidency, widespread corruption and a winner-takes-all 
approach to the elections. This seems to support the greed hypothesis, since these factors 
contributed to the economic incentives for the conflict that were described earlier in this chapter. 
Other, non-economic factors also played a role though. The crisis was aggravated by the 
ineffective responses of the national government, the police, and the military. This lengthened the 
conflict, and even directly caused violence in some cases (HRW, 2008). The fourth and final 
condition for a civil conflict was thus also met in Kenya: the institutions were sufficiently weak to 
allow violent riots to have some success.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 The salience of the four conditions for civil conflict that came out of the greed hypothesis 
literature is not as clear in the Kenya case as was expected. The grievances that ethnic groups had 
were indeed a necessary condition for the mobilisation of ethnic groups. Without grievances 
surrounding land, inequality and injustice, tensions would not have run this high and no conflict 
would have followed. So far, the greed hypothesis works. However, unlike what the theory 
predicts, the political elite was not a unified group leading a centralised rebellion. Instead, 
localised violence led by tribal leaders took place. The national elite did little to stop the violence, 
but was in most cases not directly involved in it either. Furthermore, the motivations for entering 
the conflict were not exclusively economic. The desire to capture the state’s resources played a 
role in heightening the stakes for the election and leading to the harsh 2007 election campaign and 
the rigging of these elections, but the violence itself was more directly motivated by the land 
grievances. Land is an important economic resource in Kenya and some local leaders may have 
profited from the violence through gaining control over the land, but the main motivation for the 
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violent mobs seemed to have been in the symbolic tribal value of the land. There were enough 
financial means to fund the conflict, although because economic circumstances were favourable 
for conflict and violence was on a local level relatively few resources were necessary. This 
funding was, again, mostly provided on a local level. Finally, the weakness of the government and 
its institutions provided further opportunities for violence and also allowed the demonstrations 
and riots to go unchecked. The ineffective responses by both the national government and local 
police forces only aggravated the conflict, eventually leading to the large-scale crisis that Kenya 
suffered from. This analysis suggests some weaknesses of the greed hypothesis, since its 
application to this specific case is at some points problematic. The next chapter will discuss these 
weaknesses and discussion points.  
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5 Strengths and weaknesses of the greed hypothesis 
 
 As was seen in the previous chapters, the greed hypothesis literature can do a good deal of 
explaining on what happened during the 2007-08 Kenya crisis. From the greed literature, four 
conditions for violent ethnic conflict have been established. In the previous chapter, these four 
have been applied to the Kenya case, but this proved to be problematic. The analysis has shed 
some light on the Kenya case, explaining how a country that seemed to stable and peaceful could 
descend into a destructive conflict. But what does the appliance of the theory to the Kenya case 
say about the greed hypothesis itself? Should the greed hypothesis be adjusted, changed or even 
rejected in light of the evidence from Kenya’s 2007-08 crisis, or does this just confirm what the 
greed hypothesis already knew? 
 
5.1 The nature of ethnicity 
 One of the most relevant and substantive critiques of the greed hypothesis could come 
from the side of the more primordialist arguments. As the Kenya case shows, there may be 
something more to ethnicity than the greed hypothesis claims. Caselli and Coleman, for instance, 
focused on the use of ethnicity as a mechanism for mobilising groups and enforcing coalition 
membership (2006). However, it seems to be more important than that. In Kenya, ethnicity plays a 
vital role in daily life, and even more so in politics. Politics were divided by ethnicity for 
generations, and elections are seen as a contest between different ethnic alliances consisting of the 
main ethnic groups (Mueller, 2011: p. 104-105). Furthermore, important grievances such as 
displacement from tribal lands and inequality played out at an ethnic level. This importance of 
ethnicity goes beyond what could be expected from it serving as a mobilising mechanism or “a 
technology for group membership and exclusion” (Caselli & Coleman, 2006: p. 30). The existing 
ethnic grievances were indeed used by political elites, exploited for political or economic gain, but 
the root cause of the conflict should perhaps not only be ascribed to the greed of these politicians, 
as the greed hypothesis seems to suggest. The underlying ethnic grievances were always present, 
and it is highly likely that if the election had ended differently the violence would still have 
broken out at a different point. If this is true, then the economic circumstances were just an 
immediate rather than a structural cause of the conflict, while the ethnic grievances play a far 
more important role. It seems Clifford Geertz had an important point when he said, as quoted 
earlier in this text, that “congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an 
ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves” (Geertz, 1963: p. 109).  
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 Specifically, land is a highly sensitive issue in this regard. Land serves as an economic 
resource, and the desire to capture and control it as has been seen in the Kenya case may be a 
motive in line with the greed hypothesis, but land also has highly symbolic tribal value. Control 
over land is important for ethnic groups far beyond that land’s economic value. This shows that 
perhaps the greed hypothesis and its focus on economic variables may fall short in explaining the 
motives behind violence. An important question is what the cause is and what the effect. Are the 
grievances in themselves harmless and is it the economic interests that cause and explain conflict, 
as the greed hypothesis would claim? Or are those economic interests just a short-term cause for 
the conflict, with the ethnic grievances providing the structural reasons? Given the evidence 
provided in the previous chapters, the latter option seems more likely. However, it is very hard to 
accurately find and describe what motivates people when entering a conflict. The truth may well 
be in the middle, with both ethnic and economic arguments playing a role. The point here is that 
the greed hypothesis is an excellent tool for short-term explanations for conflicts such as the one 
in Kenya, but it should not ignore the more structural causes that are provided by ethnic 
grievances.  
 
5.2 The goals of elite groups 
 One of the central themes of the greed hypothesis is that grievances alone do not cause a 
conflict (Collier, 2006). Things like injustice, inequality and poverty just act as an excuse for the 
conflict, a story on why the group fights to sell to the world – and themselves. For grievances to 
turn into conflict, they need to be activated by an elite that has an economic interest in the conflict 
and used to mobilise the population (Caselli & Coleman, 2006). In Kenya’s case, this is for the 
some part confirmed. The grievances related to land displacement, domination of one ethnic 
group, and poverty were present for years, yet did not lead to a large-scale conflict. Ahead of the 
2007 elections, nothing changed in the grievances themselves: the only thing that did change is 
that the political elites mobilised the ethnic groups on the basis of those grievances. This 
happened during the election campaign, in which both sides aimed to mobilise their ethnic group 
as best as they could (Mueller, 2011: p. 104-105). The elite, in this case formed by the two 
political parties PNU and ODM, wanted control over the state and its resources, which is a goal 
that fits the greed hypothesis (see Grossman, 1999). Because Kenyan politics are perceived as a 
contest where the winner takes control over the whole state, there was much to gain in the election 
and perhaps even more to lose (Mueller, 2011; Smith, 2009). Thus, the greed theory seems to give 
a logical explanation for why the election campaign was this hard. However, there is a crucial 
difference between this line of thinking and the greed literature: mobilising grievances to win an 
election is completely different from using them to enter a conflict.  
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 There are some things in the Kenya case that do not seem to stroke with the greed 
hypothesis. Although they were the ones who initially mobilised their ethnic groups, there is no 
evidence that either Odinga or Kibaki were directly involved in the actual conflict (HRW, 2008). 
Neither candidate was ever on record promoting the conflict or calling for violent action. And 
despite some finger-pointing between the two camps, the two candidates are not implicated in the 
ICC proceedings on the human rights violations after the elections. This does not seem to support 
the greed hypothesis: the presidential candidates were the ones who have most to win from the 
election, so logically they should be the ones to start the conflict to gain by illegal means what 
they could not win through an election. Yet this did not happen. The two candidates are far from 
innocent since their aggressive electoral campaign was what mobilised the ethnic tensions, but 
they did not lead their constituents into violence.  
 
 The greed hypothesis normally focuses on a centralised group of rebels fighting a 
centralised government (Collier, 2006). In this situation, the person who activates ethnic 
grievances is the same as the one leading the group into conflict. But in Kenya’s crisis this was 
not the case. As the Kenya case has shown though, there were plenty of leaders lower on the party 
hierarchy with significant economic interests in the conflict. These lower-level party officials as 
well as local ethnic leaders – village elders, for instance – more loosely affiliated with the political 
parties led their groups into violence (Waki Report, 2009). The role of the presidential candidates 
and others higher up the party hierarchies is complicated, with some evidence tying some of them 
directly to the violence (HRW, 2008). Even some very prominent politicians are implicated in 
these violent responses after the election: then Member of Parliament and former minister and 
current vice-president William Ruto and later presidential candidate and eventual winner of the 
2013 elections Uhuru Kenyatta are both charged at the ICC court for crimes against humanity 
during the crisis, amongst other prominent politicians. Yet, the violence was mostly organised and 
funded on a local level, with relatively little involvement of national elites. These village elders 
and low-level party officials had significant economic interests in the conflict. The greed 
hypothesis’ way of thinking can thus be used to explain this for some part, even if the literature 
itself does not talk about local leadership in conflicts.  
 
5.3 Is the greed hypothesis over-simplified? 
 The greed hypothesis literature may be some of the most influential literature on civil 
conflicts, it is also well over a decade old. In that decade, much has changed. Modern media and 
an African economic boom are just two of the most important changes. It may be questionable 
whether the greed hypothesis has kept up with that. Collier’s greed hypothesis (2000) seems to be 
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focused towards states that are almost lawless: states where a military coup is instantly accepted 
by all those involved. In these states, according to the greed hypothesis the (weak) government 
would be opposed by an organised and centralised group of rebels. These rebels would attempt to 
capture control of the state, or just of the resources that are important to them (Collier, 2006). This 
is almost a caricature of what is the case in most African countries now. Kenya is a prime 
example of how this old way of looking at Africa’s conflicts may be outdated and over-simplified. 
Kenya has been a democracy for a number of years and it has become an open country that 
benefits from trade and foreign investment. In such a country, performing a military coup would 
hurt the country’s economy significantly. More importantly, a coup would be far harder to 
execute. After years of democracy, it is questionable whether the civilians and the military would 
just accept a coup. And as an important country in African trade and politics, international 
pressure would also be against anyone attempting to organise a coup or rebel movement. In other 
words, the risk of organising a centralised rebel army would be far bigger than what would be 
acceptable if the leaders follow rational economic thought.  
 In addition to the raised cost for an organised rebellion, the possibilities of organising 
violence are far more diffuse than they would be in the simplified country the greed hypothesis 
assumes. Rather than just one elite group having the power to organise violence, the Kenya case 
shows that many local leaders and violent gangs have this capacity as well. The diffusion of 
violence was, in fact, one of the reasons local actors in Kenya could cause such widespread chaos 
(Mueller, 2011). All this reflects a different kind of ethnic conflict from what the greed hypothesis 
proposes: localised violence that is not focused against the government or police but directly 
against the other ethnic groups. The local leaders were not only motivated by the potential gains if 
their political party would control the government, but also by the possibility of re-gaining their 
lands when the other ethnic groups had been thrown out of those. Whether this kind of conflict is 
really different from older conflicts is debatable and beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
 The greed hypothesis is still very useful for explaining violent conflict. However, Mac 
Ginty and Williams claim that the theory not only attempts to explain, but also predict conflict 
(2009: p. 30). The diffused and localised violence that is evident in the Kenya case instead of 
large-scale rebel movements makes it far harder to predict where and when conflict is going to 
occur. The complicated and globalised economic situation only adds further problems to this. All 
this does not mean the greed hypothesis is not useful: it provides excellent explanations of how 
and why conflicts occurred by focusing on economic factors in combination with other 
grievances. The four conditions for violent conflict that came forward out of this thesis and were 
tested on the Kenya case show that it is possible to at least partly explain conflicts using greed 
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literature. The complicated nature of all of the ethnic grievances, the elite’s interests, the 
economic situation and the government’s weakness make clear how hard it would be to predict an 
ethnic conflict in advance, rather than provide a post-hoc explanation.  
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6 Conclusion and recommendations 
 
 In the introduction to this thesis, one research question was posed with four different sub-
questions. The main question was: How can the greed hypothesis be used to explain the explosion 
of violence in Kenya after the 2007 general elections? The four sub-questions to this main 
question were: what does the existing scientific literature say about the relation between economic 
variables and ethnic conflict? Is it possible to establish some conditions, based on the literature, 
that need to be met for a civil conflict to arise? Were these conditions based on the greed literature 
present in Kenya ahead of its crisis? And finally, how does the analysis of Kenya’s crisis reflect 
on the greed hypothesis literature? Using a combination of existing academic literature and an in-
depth case-study of Kenya’s 2007-08 crisis, this thesis has provided answers to these questions.  
 
 In order to answer the first two questions, a literature review on the relations between 
ethnic fragmentation, conflict, and various economic variables was done in chapter 2. Books and 
articles from many theoretical perspectives were studied, but the focus of this review was on the 
greed hypothesis by Paul Collier (2000). This greed hypothesis was not just taken for granted, but 
criticised, weighted and at some points adjusted using work by different scholars. Using this 
literature, four conditions for ethnic conflict were established. These were hypothesised to be 
requirements for any kind of ethnic conflict to arise in a country. The four conditions were: (1) the 
presence of perceived grievances on the basis of which ethnic groups can be mobilised; (2) a 
political elite with the capability of mobilising the ethnic group(s) that has an economic interest in 
promoting the conflict; (3) economic resources that can be captured for use by the rebel groups to 
finance their struggle; and (4) a government that is weak enough for the rebellion to be potentially 
successful. These conditions were then ready to be tested in the case-study. 
 
 In chapter 3, the ethnic and political situation in Kenya was reviewed, before the election 
campaign and the subsequent violence that characterised the 2007-08 post-election crisis was 
studied in depth. This information was then in chapter 4 used to answer the third of the four sub-
questions this thesis asked in the introduction: were the four conditions found in the literature 
review present in the case of Kenya? In this review, the advantages and disadvantages of these 
four conditions – and by extension, the greed hypothesis – were shown. Each aspect had a 
different role leading up to the conflict, but all were necessarily present to cause and aggravate it. 
The first condition, the presence of ethnic grievances, is required because without these 
grievances the population will have no motivation to enter a conflict. In Kenya’s case, these 
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grievances were formed by various land-related disputes, as well as by the perceived domination 
of economy and government by the Kikuyu tribe of president Kibaki. Still, the presented 
grievances could not ignite into a conflict without the second condition: a political elite to 
mobilise the population on the basis of the grievances. The political elite must have certain 
economic interests to pursue in the conflict, otherwise it would have no motive to enter it. In 
Kenya’s case, the grievances were initially activated by the two presidential candidates Kibaki 
and Odinga, but mobilised into violence by various local leaders. Both the presidential candidates 
and the local leaders were at least for some part motivated by economic gain, as predicted by the 
greed hypothesis. However, other factors such as ethnicity and the land grievances also played 
major roles in causing the conflict. Funding of the conflict, the third condition, was also provided 
through local means. Because of the local nature of the violence, no major sources of funding 
from valuable natural resources or other means were required. The fourth and final condition was 
also met: the Kenyan government was both weak and ineffective in its response to the violence, 
which contributed to both causing and aggravating the conflict. Thus, the Kenya case showed the 
value of the four conditions.  
 When reflecting on the literature using the new insights from the case study for the final 
sub-question, this thesis asked some questions to whether the economic variables proposed by the 
greed hypothesis were really the structural cause of the conflicts, or whether this structural cause 
was formed by the ethnic grievances. The conclusion was drawn that the greed hypothesis may be 
in need of an update, because its simplified rebels versus government nature does not apply to the 
current state of most African nations any more. Furthermore, the simplified nature of the greed 
hypothesis was discussed, and the thesis concluded that the greed hypothesis can be highly 
effective in explaining conflicts after they had happened, but perhaps less so in actually predicting 
them. Still, the greed hypothesis and the four conditions for conflict this thesis found were clearly 
useful and deserve further academic research.  
 
 For future research on this topic, it might be worthwhile looking further at the four 
conditions and whether their logic also applies to other cases. Perhaps they could even be tested in 
a large-N test taking many conflicts into account, although this will be complicated. The greed 
hypothesis would need to be updated for that, in order for it to apply to the localised violence that 
was seen in Kenya, because as it is the greed hypothesis focuses exclusively on centrally 
organised rebellions. What certainly deserves further attention are the questions on whether ethnic 
grievances are the actual structural cause behind the conflicts instead of the economic interests 
and elite mobilisation. Finally, it might be worth researching whether the greed hypothesis 
literature can be used to predict rather than just explain ethnic conflicts. This is a complicated 
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matter which is far beyond the scope of this paper though, which at least showed that the greed 
hypothesis’ logic can be used to provide an short-term explanation for why a conflict occurs at a 
specific moments, even if it does have its weaknesses.  
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